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lN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
JAMES McMAHON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

\
Case No.

I

I

I

.JOHN vV. TURNER, Warden,
Ubh State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent.

12376

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Third
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
Stat.e of Utah, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge,
denying appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a full hearing, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft
ordered the denial of appellant's petition for writ of
habeas corpus and remanded appellant to the custody of
respondent.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits tbat the judgment of the district
court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 8 and 9, 1970, before the I-ionorable Charles
C. Cowley, Judge, Second Judicial District Court in 8lld
for the County of Weber, State of Utah, appellant was
tried and convicted by a jury of the crime of receiving
stolen property (R. 21). On April 27, 1970, Judge Cowley
sentenced appellant to serve a term not to exceed five
years in the Utah State Prison (R. 22). At that time
Judge Cowley took under advisement a request for an appeal bond (R. 23) and stayed execution of sentence by remanding appellant to the county jail in order that appellant might consult with his attorney concerning a future
trial (R. 22). Thereafter, a judgment, sentence and
commitment was prepared and filed in the county clerk's
office on April 28, 1970.
On July 1, 1970, in response to appellant's letter of
June 24, 1970, Mr. Lee M. Cummings, Clerk of the
Supreme Court of Utah, informed appellant that as the
time for appeal for his conviction had run, the Supreme
Court was without jurisdiction to consider the appeal
(R. 24).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ADMITTANCE INTO EVIDENCE OF THE
FALSE TESTIMONY DID NOT DENY APPELL-

ANT HIS RIGHTS OF DUE PROCESS BECAUSE
THE TESTIMONY WAS NOT KNOWN TO BE
FALSE BY THE STATE NOR WAS IT MATERIAL
TO THE CRIME.

Where (1), the prosecution knowingly used false
testimony, and (2), the false testimony was material to
the crime, a conviction obtained violates due process.
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935); Alcorta v.
Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 (1957); Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S.
66, 116 (1967), Harlan, J., dissenting on other grounds;
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 272 (1959); Ward v. Turner, 12 Utah 2d 310, 366 P.2d 72 (1961).
Even though in denying appellant's petition for writ
of habeas corpus the district court found that there was
no evidence in the record to support appellant's contention
that the state knowingly used false testimony to, obtain
his conviction, appellant submits the same contention befor2 this Court on appeal.
The duty of this Court, of course, is to indulge the
usual credit due the findings of the district court. Brown
v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 99, 440 P.2d 968, 970 (1968). On
n:cc,z;oition iG given to the prerogatives and advantaged position of the trial court, and his findings and judgment are indulged a presumption of correctness. Maxwell v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 163, 165, 435 P.2d 287, 288
(1967). The record is surveyed in the light most favorable
to the findings of the lower court, and the lower court will
not be reversed if there is a reasonable basis therein to
sup!JOrt the trial court's judgment. Velasquez v. Pratt,
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21 Utah 2d 229, 232, 443 P.2d 1020, 1022 (1968); State
Knepper, 18 Utah 2d 215, 418 P.2d 780 (1966).

L',

Surveying the· record in a light most favorable to
Judge Croft's findings, there are substantial reasonable
bases to support his findings that appellant failed to meet
his bmd:;n of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
the facts which would substantiate his allegations. Ma.':·
well v. Turner, supra, 20 Utah at 165; Velasquez v. Pratt, '
supra, 21 Utah 2d at 232; Teaque v. Looney, 268 F.2d
506, 508 (10th Cir. 1959).
111ere is no evidence in the record to support appellant's contention that the state knowingl.f' used false
testimony to obtain his conviction. Appellant's naked
allegation is not supported by affidavit, corroborating
statements, or any showing of proof. In this state, such
unsupported and uncorroborated allegations are insufficient to justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. As
stated by this court in ]McGuffey v. Turner, 18 Utah 2d
354, 423 P.2d 166 (1967), by quoting with approval from
Wilson v. Hand, 181 Kan. 483, 311 P.2d 1009 (1957):
"The rule is well established that the standard
of proof necessary to justify the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus is not met by uncorroborated and
unsupported statements of the petitioner." 18
Utah 2d at 359; See also Miller v. Crouse, 346 F.2d
301 (10th Cir. 1965).
As reiterated by the United States Supreme Court
in Hysler v. Florwa, 315 U.S. 411, 416 (1942), if the state
habeas corpus procedure requires more that a mere un-

,

supported contention to grant the writ, a naked allegation
that the state knowingly employed false testimony to gain
conviction is not sufficient to justify relief.
While the recent opinion in Imbler u. Craven, 298 F.
Supp. 795 (C.D. Calif. 1969) expresses a view of expanding the Supreme Court's knowing test to i..'1clude situations
where the state should have known that the testimony
was false, 298 F. Supp. at 804, the opinion is not controlling of or applicable to the present case on two counts.
First, the Supreme Court has specifically refused to
brnaden the knowing requirement beyond actual knowledge. See Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion, on other
grounds in Giles, supra, 386 U.S. at 99-112.
Second, the false testimony in Imbler was found to
meet the second requirement of being material to the
case:
"In order, however, for such false testimony
to warrant the relief here sought, it must have
been material to the case. The court finds that ...
the items of false testimony were in fact material."
298 F.2d at 803.

Viewed in a light most favorable to Judge Croft's
holding that under the facts and circumstances the effect
of the false testimony was not such as to render appellant's conviction in a manifest injustice (R. 32), a survey
of the record of the false testimony reveals that it was
not material to the case; that it was not seriously prejudicial, Alcorta, supra, 355 U.S. at 31; and that it could not
have materially affected the jury's decision. Ward, supra,
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366 P.2d at 74. The false testimony centers around how
Horne paid for the stolen snowmobile. On direct examination, Horne testified that he paid $400 in cash for it. But
on cross-examination, he stated that he had paid for it
by check, that he thought the name put on the check was
appellant's, that it could have been Bybee's name, and
that he would produce the check in court the next day
(R. 29). That afternoon, after the court was recessed,
Home was visited by McMahon and another individual
who threatened Horne (R. 133).
The next day at trial Horne returned with checks
issued by him through January 15th, none of which were
made out for $400. He testified that he had no check
made out to apellant, which was true; that he had none
for $400, which was not true as he had made out a check
to Bybee for $400; and that he had obtained $400 in cash
from his savings account and paid it to one of two men
who delivered the stolen snowmobile. He again testified
that neither of the delivery men was appellant (R. 30).
The substance of Horne's false testimony was, then,
that he had paid cash for the stolen property when he had
in reality paid for it by a check made out to Bybee.
As found by the district court, this false testimony did
not implicate appellant with the transaction (R. 31). On
the other hand, truthful testimony was given that appellant was not involved in the delivery, that no check was
made out to him. and that Home did not give the $400
in cash to appellant. Id.
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It should be noted that the complained of false testiwas induced by appellant himself. As stated by
\ome at the hearing, he feared for his own physical being
;it the
day of testimony because appellant had
thrntenetl him the night before after his first day's testimony (R. 133). As stated by the district court, "One
should not be permitted to intimidate a witness and then
complain because he does not therefore tell the truth,
particc1larly where the false testimony does not implicate
the defendant." (R. 30).
POINT II
THE ISSUES OF WHETHER HASTIE WAS AN
ACCOMPLICE AND WHETHER THERE WAS
SUFFICIENT CORROBORATION
ARE
NOT PROPERLY BROUGHT BEFORE THIS
COURT ON APPEAL FROM A DENIAL OF A
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

As stated in the recent federal decision of Johnson
v. Turner, 429 F.2d 1152, 1155 (10th Cir. 1970), the
question of whether a person is an accomplice, and thereby requiring corroboration of his testimony under Utah
Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953), is not cognizable in a
habeas corpus proceeding.
Even if the issue of whether Hastie is an accomplice
was an issue that could be properly raised on habeas
rather than appeal, the issue would still remain improper
because it is moot. As found by Judge Croft at the hearing on the writ, the trial court had already sided with
appellant by instructing the jury that Hastie was appellant's accomplice and that, therefore, his testimony needed

8

to be corroborated (R. 32). See also Jury Instmction No.
6 given in appellant's trial for case No. 9328.
1,;-{ith

to appellanl's contention that fhstie's

testimony ·.va3 J:10t sufficiently corroborated by additioual
evidence, ; espo;iclent ag'''ees with appcllnnt that such a
contention is ;:m ergun'.erit
b:r'e been raised
at an appeal of his cc·nviction (Appellant's Brief 21).
Sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction is not f,Ubject to habeas corpus review unless the conviction is
totally devoid of evidentiary support. Af athis v. People of
State of Colorado, 425 F.2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1970).
By raising the issue of the weight of evidence through
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, appellant is attempting to do that which is not countenanced by this
state's procedure: to turn habeas corpus into an appellate
review. Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 286, 431 P.2d
121 (1967). AB this court has paraphrased in many recent
decisions:
"Habeas corpus may not be used in place of
appellate review, and claimed error or irregularity
which was known at time of judgment should first
be called to trial court's attention and then raised
on appeal, and if that is not done within the time
allowed by law, judgment becomes final and not
subject to further attacks for matters which could
have been reviewed on appeal." Velasquez v.
Pratt, supra, 21 Utah 2d at 232, 443 P.2d at 1022;
see also Brown v. Turner, supra, 21 Utah at 98,
440 P.2d at 969; Sullivan v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d
85, 448 P.2d 907 (1968).
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As determined by Judge Croft, there was sufficient
c1rroborating evidence introduced into trial to satisfy the
10quirernents of Utah's corroboration of accomplice and
statute. Utah Code Ann.
77-31-18 (1953)
(R. 31). Chris H. Goodes testified that he was contacted
pcrso:1ally by appellant reg3.I'ding a snowmobile, that he
gave Home's phone number to appellant as one interested
in buying a machine, that after about two weeks he received around midnigl1t a call from one "Jim" who said
!hat he wanl:ed to get his machine back but could not get
a hold of Horne, and tliat appellant had given him a telephone ntUClber where he could be reached, which number
was in fact listed in the appellant's name. Id.
POINT III
APPELLANT FAILED TO APPEAL HIS CON\VlTHIN THE STATUTORY TIME

'iir'TION
LII/HT.

A reading of the record in the light most favorable to
Judge Croft's decision reveals that there exists substantial bases for his conclusions that appellant did not file
his appeal within the statutory time limit, that appellant
was not illegally denied his right to appeal his conviction,
and that neither Judge Cowley nor the district attorney
did anything to prevent appellant from filing his notice of
appeal (R. 28).

On April 8 and 9, 1970, appellant was tried before a
jury and convicted of the crime of receiving stolen
property (R. 21). On April 27, 1970, Judge Cowley pronounced sentence and judgment upon appellant:
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"Then it's the judgment of this court and the
sentence of the law that you serve a term of not
to exceed 5 years in the Utah State Prison, and
you will be remanded to the warden." (R. 22).
Upon suggestion that arrangements be made to allow
appellant to confer with his attorney regarding a future
trial, Judge Cowley stayed execution of the sentence
until the pending case was completed:
"MR. STRATFORD: . . . What I am concerned about, Your Honor, is that he won't have
an attorney being able to go down and see him and
come back and prepare for trial unless he wants to
make arrangements-.
THE COURT: Well, I will remand him back
to the county jail until such time as the other
case is completed and then remand him to the
warden." (R. 23).
Having issued the sentence and judgment, and having stayed execution of the sentence until the completion
of the pending trial, the only matter the court took under
advisement was the appeal bond:
"MR. BINGHAM: The motion for an appeal
bond is denied, I assume?
THE COURT: Well, I will take it under advisement until we see what happens - whether he
appeals one case to two, or what?" (R. 23).
Thereafter, on April 28, 1970, a judgment, sentence
and commitment was prepared and filed in the county
clerk's office (R. 23). These filed documents constitute
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an entry of judgment under the provisions of Utah Code
Ann. S, 77-35-22 (1953) (R. 27), and thus appellant's time
fur appeal of his conviction began to run from April 28,
1970.
The time within which an :ippeal must be taken is
jurisdictional. Sullivan u. District Court, 65 Utah 400,
237 P. 516 (1925). If an appeal is not taken within the
one month prescribed limit, the judgment becomes final
and is not subject to appellate review. Brown v. Turner,
supra, 21 Utah 2d at 98; Bryant v. Turner, supra, 19 Utah
2d at 286. As appellant failed to file his notice of appeal
within one month of his conviction, on July 1, 1970, in
response to appellant's inquiry of June 24, 1970, Mr. Lee
M. Cummings, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Utah, informed appellant that the time for appeal had gone by and
the court had no jurisdiction to consider the appeal (R.
24).
Even though appellant failed to file his notice of
appeal within the statutory time limit, he contends that
as he expressed an intent to appeal at his sentencing, he
has met the statutory procedural requirement. The argument fails for two reasons. First, an appeal must be
taken within one month after the entry of the judgment.
Utah law does not authorize an appeal to be instigated by
expressing an intent to appeal at the sentencing before
the judgment is entered. Rather, the law specifies that
an appeal is initiated by filing with the clerk of the "Court
in which the judgment or order appealed from has been
entered or filed." Utah Code Ann.
76-39-6 (1953).
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(Emphasis added.) Likewise, the statutory time limitation upon appeals states that appeal be taken within one
month "after the entry of the judgment appealed from."
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-39-5 (1953), as amended. (Emphasis
added.) Even though the statutory procedure for taking
an appeal is clear and explicit, appellant would have this
court .it-:.dicially legislate new authorization for appeal
procedures before the judgment is entered.
Second, appellant confuses an intent to appeal with
the actual appeal. At the sentencing, before the sentence
and judgment was read or entered, appellant made the
statement that he wanted to appeal the case, of course
(R. 21). The law, however, wisely does not authorize an
appeal merely because a convicted defendant expresses an
intent to appeal. Rather, Utah law requires a party seeking appeal to institute such appeal by following the prescribed requirements of filing a notice of appeal with the
clerk of the court in which the judgment has been entered
and service of such notice upon the adverse party.
As pointed out by Judge Croft, the appellant himself
did not consider his statement at the sentencing to constitute his appeal. At appellant's sentence for his other
conviction on June 16 and 17, 1970, his attorney stated
that appellant still desired to appeal his prior conviction
of receiving stolen property. Appellant's attorney then
explained to appellant that he would need to write to the
clerk of the Supreme Court of Utah to appoint counsel
to assist him in taking such an appeal (R. 27). As further
discussed by Judge Croft, appellant's failure to file his

'·)

J_d

notice of appeal within the statutory time limit was not
the fault of Judge Croft or of the state, but rather, it was
due to the lack of communication between appellant and
his
(R. 28). As also
by Judge Croft, appellant had had difficulty in communicating with the
several different attorneys that had assisted him. Id.

Even though appellant has neglected to abide by the
required statutory process for appeal, he would have this
court grant him an appeal of his conviction. The respondent rests assured that this court will not condone such a
blatmt circumvention of the statutory appeal process.

CONCLUSION
An analysis of the record, viewed in a light most
favorable to Judge Croft's decision, clearly shows that
appellant did not meet his burden of demonstrating by
the preponderance of evidence that the state knowingly
use<l material, false testimony to convict him, that the
weight of the corroborating evidence is an issue that
should not be considered by this court on appeal of a
denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, that in
any case there is sufficient testimony to corroborate the
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accomplice's testimony, and that appellant did not file
his notice of appeal within the statutory time period.
The respondent, therefore, respectfully prays that
this Court affirm the decision of the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY

Attorney General

LAUREN N. BEASLEY

Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

